The Impact of Institutional Investors in Cross-Border M&A: The Case of European Acquiring Firms by Diogo Maria Archer de Carvalho de Magalhães e Menezes
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Institutional Investors in Cross-Border M&A: 
The Case of European Acquiring Firms 
 
by 
 
 
Diogo Maria Archer de Carvalho de Magalhães e Menezes 
 
 
 
Master Dissertation in Finance  
Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto 
 
 
Supervised by: 
Jorge Bento Ribeiro Barbosa Farinha, Ph.D. 
 
 
2017
i 
 
Biographic note 
 
Diogo Menezes was born in Porto in 1991. He completed his B.Sc. in Economics at 
Faculdade de Economia do Porto in 2013. After his graduation, he undertook an 
internship in Risk Management at Banco BPI, from July 2014 to July 2015. In 
September 2015, he started the Master in Finance at Faculdade de Economia do Porto, 
the same school where he studied during the Bachelor, which he expects to complete in 
2017. Diogo is looking to start a new professional experience after the Master, 
preferably in the area of Corporate Finance.  
 
 
  
 
 
 ii 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to everyone who, directly or indirectly, 
contributed and helped me attain this objective. Particularly, I’m thankful to Professor 
Jorge Farinha for his availability, guidance and constructive feedback throughout this 
work, to my parents for their support, to my friends for their help and encouragement 
and to Teresa for her suggestions, patience and constant presence. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
The importance of institutional investors has been increasing exponentially around the 
world, year after year, in several aspects of a firm’s decision making. Considering that 
mergers and acquisitions are a major investment decision for any firm, it can be 
expected that institutional investors have an important influence on such decisions. The 
aim of this study is to analyze the impact of this type of investors on the probability of 
European firms engaging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions as acquiring firms. 
The existing studies on this topic focus mainly in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom and the present study tries to complement these researches by extending the 
evidence to other geographic areas, thus contributing to a more complete literature on 
the subject. In this study, a sample enclosing a 10-year period and spanning across 13 
different countries is employed, putting an emphasis on the diversity of the geographic 
areas covered. The findings of this investigation reveal that the presence of institutional 
investors, particularly foreign institutional investors, increases the likelihood of a firm 
acquiring a foreign firm instead of a domestic firm while the largest institutional 
shareholder is averse to cross-border deals. This research sheds new light on the 
activism of institutional shareholders regarding cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 
Europe.  
 
Key-words: Institutional Investors; Shareholder Activism; Corporate Governance; 
Mergers and Acquisitions; Cross-Border; Europe 
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Resumo 
 
A importância dos investidores institucionais tem aumentado exponencialmente em 
todo o mundo, ano após ano, em vários aspetos das decisões empresariais. 
Considerando que as fusões e aquisições são uma decisão de investimento importante, é 
expectável que os investidores institucionais tenham uma grande influência nesse tipo 
de decisões. O objectivo deste estudo é analisar o impacto deste tipo de investidores na 
probabilidade de uma empresa Europeia iniciar uma fusão ou aquisição transfronteiriça 
como adquirente. Os estudos existentes acerca deste tópico concentram-se sobretudo 
nos Estados Unidos e no Reino Unido, sendo que este estudo procura complementar a 
pesquisa existente ao alargar as evidências a outras áreas geográficas, contribuindo 
assim para uma literatura mais completa acerca deste tópico. Nesta investigação, é 
utilizada uma amostra que engloba um período de 10 anos e que inclui 13 países 
diferentes, enfatizando assim a diversidade de áreas geográficas abrangidas. Os 
resultados obtidos demonstram que a presença de investidores institucionais na estrutura 
acionista de uma empresa, em particular investidores estrangeiros, aumentam a 
probabilidade de uma empresa adquirir um alvo estrangeiro em vez de um alvo 
doméstico enquanto o maior investidor institucional demonstra aversão a este tipo de 
suões ou aquisições. Esta investigação fornece novas evidências relativamente ao 
ativismo accionista no que refere às fusões e aquisições transfronteiriças na Europa.   
 
Palavras-Chave: Investidores Institucionais; Ativismo Acionista; Governo Empresarial; 
Fusões e Aquisições; Transfronteiriço; Europa 
Códigos JEL: G15, G23, G32, G34 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, mergers and acquisitions have, once again, garnered a huge deal of 
attention, with a considerable amount of deal making activity and the emergence of 
several mega-deals, which have led many people to believe that we are currently in the 
middle of a new peak in merger activity. According to Baker & McKenzie (2016), the 
year of 2015 has established itself as a record-breaking year for cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions post-financial crisis. The overall mergers and acquisitions value in 
2015 reached USD 4.28 trillion, of which 39% corresponded to cross-border deals, 
which amounts to a value of USD 1.66 trillion. 
Furthermore, there has been an astonishing expansion of the importance of institutional 
investors since the start of the millennium. In 2015, according to The Boston Consulting 
Group (2016), the global assets under management totaled to an amount of US$71.4 
trillion, a figure approximately 2.5 times higher than the one registered in 2002, which 
was US$29 trillion.  
Given the increasing amounts of investments these institutional shareholders are 
responsible for, it is reasonable to believe they can have a major impact on mergers and 
acquisitions, especially taking into account the deal making activity in the last few 
years. In fact, mergers and acquisitions are a good setting to study the influence of 
institutional shareholders because an acquisition is an important investment decision 
likely to impact the shareholder value of the bidding firm (Gaspar et al., 2005). Thus, 
this study aims to understand the impact of institutional investors in mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Considering that there are a number of studies that focus on this subject in the U.S., in 
the U.K. and in China, this study will focus on Europe, a geographic area that has not 
received so much attention as the areas mentioned above. Moreover, Europe is an ideal 
venue for studying the importance of corporate governance in M&A given the large 
number of closely held firms and the wide range of ownership structures, corporate 
governance rules, corporate laws, securities regulations, and capital market conditions 
(Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
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Particularly, this study will provide an answer to the following research question: “Does 
the presence of institutional investors in acquiring firms lead to a higher probability of 
engaging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions?” 
The objective of the study will be achieved following the same methods employed by 
one of the similar studies (Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015), which will be addressed 
with more detail both in the literature review and in the methodology sections. 
Besides this section, this report is structured as follows: in chapter 2, a literature review 
of the topic is made. The third chapter describes the development of the research 
hypothesis. Chapter 4 describes the data and the methodological choices. In chapter 5, 
the results obtained and its analysis are presented. In the sixth and final chapter, the 
findings are discussed and suggestions for further research are made. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, a literature review of the topic is presented. First, the most relevant 
definitions of the study are presented. Next, the main theories are addressed, which are 
followed by the analysis of similar studies. 
 
2.1. Relevant Definitions 
In order to provide a better understanding of the research topic, it is fundamental to 
present some relevant definitions, which are mentioned several times throughout the 
literature review. A synthesis of the definitions can be viewed in the following table. 
 
Table 1 – Relevant Definitions Summary 
      
  Definitions Topics Authors   
  
Institutional Investors 
Definition Davis and Steil (2004)   
  
Different Types 
Davis and Steil (2004)   
  Bodie et al. (2014)   
  
Effective Monitoring 
Separation of Control Fama (1980)   
  Definition Schleifer and Vishny (1986)   
  
Shareholder Activism Different Definitions 
Black (1990); (1998)   
  Smith (1996)   
  Gillan and Starks (1998)   
  Hernández-López (2003)   
 
 
Institutional investors may be defined as specialized financial institutions that manage 
savings collectively on behalf of small investors, towards a specific objective. They 
provide a form of risk pooling for small investors with a better trade-off of risk and 
return than they could attain by investing individually. Given their large size, 
institutional investors take advantage of economies of scale, such as the possibility of 
transacting assets in large volumes, which result in lower average costs and lower 
commission charges for investors and savings in advisory fees. Considerable 
The table presents the most relevant definitions used throughout the literature review. 
Source: Own Source  
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countervailing power
1
 also results from size, which may be used to reduce transaction 
costs and custodial fees, besides giving the possibility of ensuring fair treatment by 
capital market intermediaries and the potential for improved control over invested 
companies (Davis and Steil, 2004). Among institutional investors, it is possible to 
identify several types of investors, namely unit investment trusts, pension funds, life 
insurance companies, mutual funds and hedge funds (Bodie et al., 2014, Davis and 
Steil, 2004). 
Fama (1980) advanced that the separation of security ownership and control can be an 
efficient form of economic organization and concludes that the firm is disciplined by 
competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently 
monitoring the performance of the firm. The notion of effective monitoring skills was 
then postulated by Schleifer and Vishny (1986), who argue that institutional investors, 
due to their professional skills, abundant capital and motivation to maximize 
shareholder value, have the incentive to monitor and supervise the management of the 
companies in which they are shareholders, in order to overcome agency problems. 
One of the first definitions of shareholder activism was provided by Black (1990). He 
presents a broad definition and refers to it as any formal or informal effort to monitor 
corporate managers or to communicate a desire for change in a company's management 
or policies. On a subsequent paper, he refers to shareholder activism as proactive efforts 
to change firm behavior or governance rules (Black, 1998). Another definition that 
should be noticed is from Smith (1996), who says that the monitoring and the attempts 
to produce changes in the organizational structure of firms not perceived to be pursuits 
to maximize shareholder wealth constitute shareholder activism. Gillan and Starks 
(1998) posit that shareholder activism can be viewed as an investor who tries to change 
the status quo through “voice”, without a change in control of the firm. They add that 
the referred “voice” can take the form of shareholder proposals, direct negotiations with 
management and public targeting of corporations. Furthermore, Hernández-López 
(2003) refers to shareholder activism as any action a shareholder may take, based on his 
rights as a shareholder, with the objective of influencing the firm management. 
                                                        
1 Countervailing power: balancing of the market power of one group by that of another group (Business 
Dictionary, 2016).  
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2.2. Main Theories 
2.2.1. Determinants of Cross-Border M&A 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are affected by several economic and 
institutional factors. One of the first studies to devote to the determinants of cross-
border acquisitions is from Rossi and Volpin (2004), who focus on the differences in 
laws and regulation across countries. They find that target firms are typically from 
countries with poorer investor protection than the countries of the acquiring firms, 
which suggests that cross-border deals have an important corporate governance 
component, as they improve the degree of investor protection within target firms. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show that cross-border acquisitions trigger higher 
wealth effects than domestic acquisitions, as acquirers pay a lower premium in foreign 
deals and this effect is more pronounced as the acquirer possesses better corporate 
governance standards. 
Di Giovanni (2005) demonstrates that the domestic financial conditions are crucial in 
determining the acquisition of companies abroad. He shows that firms in countries with 
developed stock markets are more prone to acquire abroad whereas geographical 
distance is negatively associated with cross-border M&A. 
Further evidence is provided by Bris and Cabolis (2008), who point that the better the 
shareholder protection and accounting standards in the acquirer’s country, the higher the 
merger premium in cross-border deals related to domestic deals. 
Moreover, Chari et al. (2010) document that when a firm from a developed country 
acquires an emerging market firm, there is an economically large increase in the 
acquiring firm’s stock price. 
Erel et al. (2012) show that firms in countries whose stock market has increased in 
value, whose currency has recently appreciated, and that have a relatively high market 
value tend to be purchasers, while firms from weaker-performing economies tend to be 
targets. 
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Furthermore, Starks and Wei (2013) provide evidence that, for cross-border mergers, 
the takeover premiums are negatively associated with the bidding firm’s home country 
shareholder protection. Correspondingly, the abnormal returns to the bidding firm 
stockholders are positively related to the quality of their home country corporate 
governance standards. 
In summary, this strand of the literature suggests that geographical proximity, financial 
development and, most significantly, corporate governance are important determinants 
of cross-border M&A. Considering that institutional investors are relevant on the 
corporate governance activities of a firm, it is logical that institutional investors may 
also be an important determinant of cross-border M&A. 
 
2.2.2. Efficacy of Shareholder Activism 
Indeed, supporting the notion that institutional investors have an important role on the 
firm’s corporate governance and decision making, there are several studies which 
provide evidence that shareholder activism is an efficient mechanism of firm 
monitoring. 
Smith (1996) provides evidence that shareholder activism is largely successful in 
changing corporate governance structures of targeted firms and these changes lead to an 
increase in shareholder wealth. 
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) conclude that, in fact, institutional investors bear a 
capacity to exert influence over the corporate management. They examine the impact 
and motivation of shareholder proposals by institutional investors and find that these 
proposals are followed by significant corporate governance activity and are effective in 
promoting changes in the companies.  
In a similar study, Gillan and Starks (2000) showed that shareholder proposals made by 
individual investors garner fewer votes than shareholder proposals made by institutional 
investors, which receive significantly more votes, providing a stronger basis to 
influence the firm’s management. In a different study, the same authors (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003) find that institutional investors may play a major role in influencing the 
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corporate governance of firms because they increase the liquidity, volatility, and price 
information of the markets in which they invest, which will result in better monitoring 
and, consequently, better corporate governance of the companies.  
Hartzell and Starks (2003) document that the presence of concentrated institutional 
ownership is positively related with pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial 
compensation and negatively related to the level of such compensation, which implies 
that institutional monitoring mitigates the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders.  
Furthermore, Brav et al. (2008) state that informed shareholder monitoring can reduce 
agency costs in invested firms and the presence of institutional investors leads to a 
disciplinary pressure on the management of public firms to make shareholder value a 
priority, which shows that large institutional investors possess the ability to enhance the 
value of their investments.  
Klein and Zur (2009) examine activism campaigns by hedge funds and conclude that 
these shareholders are extremely successful in leading a firm’s management to accept 
their demands. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) also provide evidence that shareholder 
proposals made by institutional investors are a useful device in monitoring firms with 
exacerbated agency problems.  
Aggarwal et al. (2011) demonstrate that monitoring by institutional shareholders has a 
direct effect on corporate governance, functioning as a disciplinary mechanism against 
poorly performing CEOs.  
Cuñat et al. (2012) provide evidence that accepted shareholder proposals initiated by 
institutional shareholders have a positive impact on the firm’s stock price and this 
reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional 
ownership and stronger investor activism. 
Aggarwal et al. (2015) document that, in the case of an upcoming proxy voting process, 
institutional investors restrict share lending and recall their loaned shares in order to 
vote and this effect is associated with less support for management proposals and more 
support for shareholder proposals, which suggests that the votes of institutional 
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investors are an effective mechanism of corporate governance. This effect is higher for 
firms with a higher proportion of investors with strong incentives to monitor.  
Considering that most of the prior research had been conducted in the U.S., Iliev et al. 
(2015) extend the evidence to a large-scale sample of countries from Europe, Asia, 
South America and Africa and demonstrate that the use of voting to engage in 
shareholder activism provides an efficient monitoring process in firms all around the 
world.  
Boone and White (2015) examine the effects of institutional ownership on the firms’ 
information and trading environment and conclude that higher institutional ownership is 
associated with greater management disclosure, analyst following, and liquidity, 
resulting in lower information asymmetry. The institutional investors’ predilection for 
low information asymmetry facilitates information production, enhancing monitoring. 
Ying and Yawen (2016) provide evidence that both exit and voting against management 
are important governance mechanisms when institutional shareholders are dissatisfied 
with the company’s management, even if voting is more a prominent mechanism. 
Moreover, funds with smaller ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are 
more likely to exit, and funds are more likely to exit small, liquid firms with greater 
insider ownership. 
Finally, Denes et al. (2017) conduct an extensive survey on shareholder activism and 
draw two important conclusions: first, shareholder activism has a major impact on a 
firm’s corporate governance; second, shareholder activism has become more value 
increasing over time, which suggests activists have learned and adapted their strategies 
over time, particularly through the development of hedge fund activism. 
 
2.2.3. Shareholder Activism Limitations 
Nonetheless, there are some opposing views. Most of the critiques to the theory of 
shareholder activism constituting an efficient mechanism of firm monitoring focus on 
the high monitoring costs, which suggests that only institutional investors who have a 
considerable size and possess a high stake in the firm may act as activists.  
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Lipton and Rosenblum (1991) argue that the lack of information, time and expertise of 
institutional investors often limits the capability to monitor a firm’s management.  
Maug (1998) demonstrates that, if stock markets are less liquid, large shareholders will 
engage in less monitoring because they are not able to cover the monitoring costs 
through informed trading.  
Kahn and Winton (1998) expose that a higher ownership stake increases the 
institution’s desire to intervene and the threshold at which the intervention becomes 
attractive varies with the sign and size of the trading impact of the intervention.  
Karpoff (2001) summarizes that shareholder activism creates little value and is not 
associated with subsequent significant changes in the corporate governance of firms.  
Parrino et al. (2003) find that institutional investors which are more concerned about 
holding prudent securities prefer to sell shares when they are unhappy with firm 
performance instead of exerting efforts to monitor management. 
Tihanyi et al. (2003) argue that the different types of institutional investors may not 
equally have the same interests because of increased risks and organizational 
complexity.  
Gillan and Starks (2003) underline that only shareholders with large positions are likely 
to earn a return on their investments that is large enough to justify the monitoring costs 
involved when engaging in shareholder activism.  
Bebchuk (2007) highlights that activist shareholders often face significant costs, high 
levels of uncertainty and staggered boards, all of which block activism.  
Becht et al. (2010) study the effects of shareholder activism by a specific fund, the 
Hermes UK Focus Fund, and even though they report substantial benefits, these are 
attained primarily through private interventions, a sort of action that may not be 
accessible for all institutional investors, particularly for smaller investors.  
Levit and Malenko (2011) show that nonbinding shareholder proposals can be effective 
only if there is a threat of a proxy fight by an activist investor and if the conflict of 
interest between the activist and the other shareholders is sufficiently large. Their study 
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also suggests that the efforts and costs along with fear of managerial retaliation might 
deter activist investors from submitting proposals and the tradeoff between these costs 
and the expected benefits varies across shareholders depending on their holdings in the 
company, their private information and their preferences.  
Gantchev (2013) measures the costs of activist monitoring and provides cost 
benchmarks for evaluating the net returns to activism. His findings suggest that 
monitoring costs play a major role in the institutional investors’ decisions, as these costs 
reduce the activist mean abnormal activist return by two-thirds and only the top quartile 
of activists earns higher returns on their activist investments.  
Mori and Ikeda (2015) demonstrate that, in order to become a monitor, a shareholder 
must win the majority support of other shareholders. To obtain this majority, a 
dividend-seeking shareholder might have an incentive to propose lower dividends than 
the tax-optimum, providing an unprofitable monitoring activity as long as the private 
benefits of tax-saving are greater than the pecuniary loss from the monitoring activity. 
Norli et al. (2015) show that shareholder’s incentives to intervene as monitors are 
weakened by high costs of activism, particularly when the firms’ stocks are not liquid.  
McCahery et al. (2016) document that there are several constraints for institutional 
investors to engage in shareholder activism, particularly liquidity concerns, as investors 
that are less concerned with stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of exit threats is dependent on the ownership stake size and whether other 
large shareholders are also present. 
 
2.2.4. Pressure-Resistant Institutional Investors 
Given the several types of institutional investors and evidences that not all institutions 
monitor the invested firm’s management, Brickley et al. (1988) propose that institutions 
should be divided upon three mutually exclusive categories, based on their 
susceptibility to management influence: pressure-sensitive institutions, pressure 
resistant institutions and pressure indeterminate institutions. They find that pressure 
resistant institutions, that are free of conflicts of interest (in which mutual funds and 
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public pension funds are included), are more likely to influence the management of 
firms and proceed as active monitors than pressure-sensitive institutions (in which 
insurance companies and trusts can be identified), who do not want to risk losing their 
business relationships with the investee firms and thus, have a more passive attitude. 
The following studies opt to divide institutions in two categories instead of three, by 
joining in the same category the pressure-sensitive institutions and the pressure 
indeterminate institutions. Almazan et al. (2005) demonstrate that pressure resistant 
institutions can provide a more intense monitoring of corporate management than other 
types of investors, more specifically on executive pay and compensation.  
Chen et al. (2007) argue that only pressure resistant institutions specialize in monitoring 
and influencing efforts while other institutions simply do not monitor. Furthermore, 
these pressure resistant institutions focus on monitoring rather than trading for profit. 
Cornett et al. (2007) find a significant relationship between a firm’s operating cash flow 
returns and institutional ownership but only for the pressure resistant institutions, which 
are less likely to have a business relationship with the firm and state that these investors 
are better suited to monitor and discipline the firm’s management, unlike pressure-
sensitive institutions, whose interests in maintaining business relations with the firm 
compromise them as effective monitors.  
Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that, among pressure resistant institutions, we can find 
the foreign institutional investors. Foreigners are effective monitors because, since they 
belong to a different country, they are much less likely to have business relations with 
the invested firms than domestic institutional investors. Thus, foreign institutional 
investors are more capable of wielding pressure on the firm’s management and enhance 
shareholder value. 
As for Elyasiani and Jia (2010), they find that pressure resistant institutions have a 
larger effect on firm performance than pressure-sensitive institutions, namely on 
decreasing information asymmetry and increased incentive-based compensation, which 
leads to a more effective monitoring.  
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2.2.5. Foreign vs. Domestic Institutional Investors 
The argument that foreign institutional investors are effective monitors of a firm’s 
management is, however, not entirely consensual, as the performance of foreign 
investors compared to domestic investors has presented mixed evidence. For a long 
time, the consensus among academics and researchers was that domestic investors have 
advantages over foreign investors in trading stocks in their own countries.  
Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) compare the performance of UK mutual funds and US 
mutual funds which invest in US portfolios and find that UK funds perform worse than 
the US domestic funds mainly because of informational disadvantages.  
Kang and Stulz (1997) investigate stock ownership in Japanese firms and find evidence 
that foreign institutional investors hold portfolios with higher volatility but, even so, are 
not able to outperform the market portfolio because they don’t have access to the same 
information as domestic investors.  
Coval and Moskowitz (2001), using U.S. data, identify a strong geographic link 
between mutual fund investment and performance. They document that mutual fund 
managers have a better performance and earn substantial abnormal returns when they 
select stocks of firms that are geographically closer to them than when they select 
stocks of firms more distant to their location. They suggest that this performance is a 
compensation for the improved monitor capabilities or access to private information 
from firms geographically proximate to them.  
Choe et al. (2005) show that, in Korea, foreign investors pay more when they buy 
shares and receive less when they sell them than domestic investors due to information 
disadvantages.  
Using transaction data from the Indonesian stock market, Dvořák (2005) investigates 
whether foreign or domestic institutional investors have an information advantage and 
concludes that, in fact, domestic investors possess an information advantage.  
Leuz et al. (2009) show that foreign investors invest less in firms that reside in countries 
with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are 
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conducive to governance problems mainly due to the monitoring costs and information 
asymmetry foreign investors face. 
Despite the evidence presented above, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that, in 
Finland, foreign institutional investors are more sophisticated than domestic 
institutional investors, being able to obtain a better selection of stocks and outperform 
the domestic portfolios.  
Froot et al. (2001) show that international portfolio inflows have a positive relation with 
the invested firms’ stock returns, which suggests the market views the presence of 
foreign institutional investors as a positive signal. 
In the aforementioned article, Dvořák (2005) highlights that, in defiance of their 
conclusions, some foreign institutions, due to their expertise and experience, may have 
access to better information than other foreign institutions, delivering a superior 
performance.  
Froot and Ramadorai (2008) document a positive relationship of cross-border equity 
flows to price and net asset value returns, suggesting that informational advantages are 
responsible for the observed predictability.  
Chen et al. (2009), using an intraday transaction dataset from Taiwan, show that, given 
access to the same information, foreign investors outperform domestic investors, 
earning large positive abnormal returns and conclude that foreign investors are more 
sophisticated when it comes to interpreting information.  
Moreover, Huang and Shiu (2009) analyze the effects of foreign equity ownership in 
Taiwan and their results divulge a pronounced foreign ownership effect, as firms with 
high foreign institutional ownership outperform firms with low institutional ownership.  
Aggarwal et al. (2011) conclude that monitoring and activism by foreign institutional 
investors lead to better firm performances than local institutional investors can obtain, 
due to their independence from local corporate managers.  
Ozkan (2012) demonstrates that, in the post-acquisition period, domestic institutional 
shareholders do not play a significant role in determining the level of CEO pay during 
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the year following an acquisition, while foreign institutional shareholders have a 
significant influence in it. 
A more recent research, from Huang and Zhu (2015), suggests that involving foreign 
institutional investors in corporate governance practices can significantly reduce 
expropriation by controlling shareholders. 
Kim et al. (2016) try to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the performance of 
domestic investors against foreign investors. They find that in aggregate, domestic, but 
not foreign, institutional ownership is negatively related to the extent of earnings 
management. Additionally, domestic institutional ownership becomes more negatively 
linked to earnings management relative to foreign institutional ownership when 
proximity to information becomes more important as measured by information 
asymmetry around the investee firms. As foreign institutional investors become more 
familiar with the host country’s accounting practices and culture, they become as 
effective as domestic institutional investors in constraining earnings management. 
When they isolate conditions under which the comparative monitoring advantage of 
foreign institutions likely work to a greater effect, they also find evidence that 
ownership by foreign institutional investors located in the same geographic region as 
the investee firms is more negatively related to earnings management than domestic 
institutional ownership; foreign institutional ownership is significantly and negatively 
related to earnings management in firms with higher, but not lower, levels of free cash 
flow; and ownership of foreign institutional investors from developed countries is 
significantly and negatively related to earnings management in emerging countries. 
 
2.3. Similar (Relevant) Studies 
The topic of institutional investors and M&A has garnered a great deal of attention, 
which can be verified by the several existing studies (namely regarding the U.S.).  
Stulz et al. (1990) provide evidence that, in a sample of successful tender offers, the 
target’s share of the total takeover gains increases with target managerial ownership and 
decreases with institutional ownership.  
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Ambrose and Megginson (1992) report that the absolute levels of institutional 
shareholdings do not have any influence on the probability of receiveing a takeover bid 
but the net change in institutional shareholdings in the quarter of the year before the 
takeover bid is negatively related to the probability of receiveing a takeover bid. 
The method of financing in corporate acquisitions is also affected by the presence of 
institutional investors, as Martin (1996) exhibits. According to his study, the likelihood 
of financing an acquisition with shares increases significantly with higher institutional 
shareholdings.  
Gaspar et al. (2005) show that target firms with short-term institutional shareholders are 
more likely to receive an acquisition bid but get lower premiums and bidder firms with 
short-term shareholders experience significant worse bnormal returns around the merger 
announcement as well as a higher long-run underperformance.  
Qiu (2006) shows that the presence of large pension funds as institutional shareholders 
has a substantial effect in diminishing value-reducing M&A activity and, when firms 
with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively 
better in the long-run. 
Chen et al. (2007) document that only concentrated holdings by institutional 
shareholders are related to post-merger performance and that the presence of these 
institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely.  
Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) propose that institutional shareholdings do not lose 
money around public merger announcements because they hold substantial stakes in the 
targets and compensate the losses from the acquiring firm with the gains from the target 
firm, which possibly gives rise to conflicts of interest. However, Harford et al. (2011) 
investigate this cross-holding hypothesis and conclude that the majority of institutional 
shareholders in bidder firms have no investment whatsoever in target firms, which 
proves that cross-holdings do not explain value-reducing acquisitions. 
Massa and Xu (2013) show that liquid firms are bought more often by firms with high 
institutional ownership and these deals are associated with higher premiums and higher 
announcement returns for the target firms.  
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Nain and Yao (2013) provide evidence that more skilled mutual funds hold shares of 
companies that make more successful acquisitions and these firms have higher 
probabilities of engaging in further acquisitions.  
Roosenboom et al. (2014) find that firms with lower stock liquidity have higher acquirer 
gains for takeovers of private targets and this relationship is stronger if the threat of exit 
by institutional shareholders is weak.  
Fich et al. (2015) establish that the presence of monitoring institutional investors in 
target firms is associated with a higher probability of deal completion, a higher bid 
premium, a higher probability that the bid is revised upwards and also a lower acquirer 
return. 
However, these studies focus on particular aspects of how institutional investors affect 
the corporate governance of a firm and its impact on M&A but do not investigate their 
impact on the likelihood of engaging in cross-border M&A.  
Ferreira et al. (2010) complement these studies with a comprehensive research on the 
role of institutional investors in M&A around the world. Particularly, they investigate if 
the presence of foreign investors as shareholders of corporations makes takeovers by 
foreign bidders less necessary and if the presence of foreign institutional shareholders 
facilitates cross-border M&A. Even though they utilize a worlwide sample, the vast 
majoirity of deals it contains belongs to the United States. They provide evidence that 
international investments by institutional money managers facilitates cross-border 
M&A and helps to reduce the bargaining and transaction costs associated with the deals 
and this effect is stronger when legal institutions are weaker, capital markets are less 
developed, and information asymmetry and private benefits of control are higher. They 
also show that firms with more foreign institutional ownership experience significantly 
lower announcement abnormal stock returns. They conclude that companies who wish 
to engage in M&A benefit from the presence of institutional investors, as they facilitate 
these deals. 
The same effects are also verified in other countries. Bena and Li (2013) document, for 
a sample of 32 European countries, that both individual(s)/family and government 
owners are negatively associated with the incidence of cross-border M&A, while the 
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foreign domicile of target owners is positively associated with the incidence of cross-
border M&A. 
Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015) document that, for the United Kingdom, the high 
level of total institutional ownership is positively related to cross-border M&A deals, 
full control acquisitions and large M&A deals, which suggests that institutional 
ownership concentration can help protect shareholders’ interests, particularly in cross-
border deals where lower shareholder protection may apply. 
In China, Zhou et al. (2016) present similar results. They provide evidence that an 
overseas acquisition attempt undertaken by an acquiring firm with greater institutional 
ownership is more likely to succeed and this relation is more proeminent when the 
acquisition is exposed to inferior institutional context. 
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3. Hypothesis Development 
In this chapter, the research hypotheses of this study are introduced. The development 
of the research hypotheses is made based on a critical analysis of the literature review 
and on the main theories addressed on it. These research hypotheses form the basis of 
this investigation. 
The literature review starts with the description of the major determinants of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. Alongside geographical proximity and financial 
development, corporate governance is one of the major determinants of cross-border 
deals, which suggests that institutional investors may also be a major factor in foreign 
acquisitions. 
Supporting the notion that institutional investors are an important agent of the corporate 
governance of a firm, there are several studies which conclude that shareholder activism 
leads to an effective monitoring of the management of the firms, namely through 
shareholder proposals, disciplinary actions of the management (such as management 
compensations) and voting processes. Considering that the decision to acquire another 
firm has an important corporate governance component, it is expectable that 
institutional investors have an impact on such decisions. Hence, the first research 
hypothesis is: 
 H1: The probability of engaging in cross-border M&A is influenced by a  greater 
concentration of total institutional ownership. 
Notwithstanding the strand of the literature mentioned above, several authors argue that 
shareholder activism is not efficient, particularly because there are several different 
types of institutional investors and all of them have different objectives and capabilities. 
The main conclusions that are drawn from these theories are that monitoring costs are 
very high and typically, the monitoring efforts will be effective only if the investor has a 
large stake on the firm. As such, it can be expected that a larger institutional investor 
has a bigger influence on the decision to acquire another company. Consequently, the 
second research hypothesis is: 
 
 
 19 
 H2: The probability of a firm engaging in cross-border M&A is affected by the 
 size of the ownership stake of the largest institutional investor. 
Taking these findings into account, some authors investigate the effectiveness of 
influencing the management of a firm by dividing the institutional investors into distinct 
categories regarding their alignment with the management. Indeed, the evidence points 
to the existence of some institutions who cannot act as monitors (pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors) whereas other institutions can be effective monitors (pressure-
insensitive institutional investors), namely because these tend to have a more 
independent position in the firms. Accordingly, the third research hypothesis is: 
 H3: The probability of a firm engaging in cross-border M&A is influenced by a 
 greater concentration of pressure-resistant institutional investors. 
Part of these authors state that foreign institutional investors are among the group of 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors, arguing that they tend to have fewer 
business relations with the firms they invest in because they are situated in a different 
country. Even so, it is important to acknowledge if foreign institutional investors have, 
in fact, better performances than domestic investors. The literature on this topic 
provides us mixed evidences, with some authors arguing that domestic investors have 
informational advantages and thus, are better than foreigners; while other authors 
believe foreign investors are better because they are more sophisticated investors. One 
of the most important conclusions from this debate seems to be that, when domestic and 
foreign investors possess the same information, foreign investors outperform domestic 
investors. Therefore, the fourth and last research hypothesis is: 
 H4: The probability of a firm engaging in cross-border M&A is influenced by a 
 greater concentration of foreign institutional ownership. 
Regarding the impact of institutional investors in M&A, most studies point to 
significant impacts on bid premiums and announcement returns. Nonetheless, there are 
not many studies which focus solely on the likelihood of engaging in these deals and 
their success.  
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The studies that focus on the impact of institutional investors on the probability to 
engage in cross-border M&A point to a significant and positive impact of institutional 
investors. Still, none of the existing studies focuses solely in a European sample of 
acquiring firms, which constitutes the literature gap that will be addressed in this study. 
A summary of the developed hypothesis can be seen in table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Hypotheses Summary 
          
  
Hypothesis Determinant 
Expected relation with likelihood 
of engaging in cross-border M&A 
  
  H1 Total Institutional Ownership Positive/Negative   
  H2 Largest Institutional Investor Positive/Negative   
  H3 
Pressure-Resistant Institutional 
Ownership Positive   
  H4 Foreign Institutional Ownership Positive/Negative   
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4. Data and Methodology 
In this chapter, a comprehensive description of the methodological aspects is presented. 
First, the choice of the countries and the time period employed in the study is justified. 
Following that, the data collection process is described. The subsequent section explains 
the choice of the variables included in the study. The posterior section presents the 
descriptive statistics of the sample. The final section describes the methodology. 
 
4.1. Choice of Countries and Time Period  
Martynova and Renneboog (2008), in an extensive survey of the literature, compiled 
findings for M&A and confirmed that M&A occur in waves. In that sense, the reasoning 
behind the choice of the time period in this study was to comprise a full M&A cycle. 
As Alexandridis et al. (2017) note, global M&A activity remained upbeat during the 
post-financial crisis recovery, with a new wave of deals emerging in 2009 and peaking 
in 2015, a landmark year for global M&A activity in which several megadeals emerged 
and the total deal value surpassed the previous record set in 2007. The following graph 
shows the total value of M&A occurred in Europe since 2001. 
 
Figure 1 – M&A Aggregate Value in Europe 
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The figure exhibits the total value of all completed M&A deals occurred in all European 
countries, in the period from 2001 to 2016. Source: Zephyr Database 
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It is possible to see that, after the financial crisis, M&A activity in Europe retreated 
significantly and remained steady until 2012. In 2013, the activity level started to 
increase, peaking in 2015, and starting to decrease in 2016, which corresponds to the 
latest wave identified by Alexandridis et al. (2017). 
Thus, in order to include the latest trends in M&A and to include a full M&A cycle, the 
ideal time period for this study would start in January 2004. However, taking in 
consideration that the databases used only had data available starting from 2006, the 
time period for our sample encompasses the last 10 years, from January 2007 until 
December 2016. 
Additionally, the selection of countries was made with the objective of including as 
many countries as possible. However, there are several different currencies among the 
countries in Europe. Thus, in order to facilitate the analysis, only countries whose 
official currency is the EUR throughout the entire sample period were selected. This 
selection encompassed 13 countries, more specifically Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Spain. 
 
4.2. Data 
Taking into account the time period and the countries stated above, the final sample was 
obtained with the following criteria, adapted from Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015): 
 The acquiring firm must be headquartered in one of the aforementioned 
countries; 
 The acquiring firm must be listed; 
 The transaction is announced during the sample period and completed at the end 
of the sample period; 
 The acquiring firm has equity ownership and financial records available on the 
Amadeus or Sabi database; 
 Financial acquiring firms are excluded (2-digit SIC code 60-69); 
 Deals with a value less than €0.1 million are excluded; 
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The final sample was comprised of 2038 M&A deals, of which 637 were domestic deals 
and 988 were cross-border deals. 
All the data employed in this study was obtained from databases of the Bureau van 
Djik. The details of the M&A transactions were obtained from the Zephyr database 
while the firm-specific data (institutional ownership and financial data) was obtained 
from the Amadeus database and, in the specific case of some Portuguese firms, was 
obtained from the Sabi database.  
 
4.3. Variables 
Besides the definition of the sample, it is paramount to detail the variables that are 
employed in this study. 
Regarding the institutional ownership variables, Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015) 
calculate the proportion of foreign institutional ownership, domestic institutional 
ownership and total institutional ownership as well as two different measures of 
institutional ownership concentration, the percentage shareholdings of the largest 
institutional ownership proportion and the cumulative five largest shareholdings held by 
institutional investors. These calculations are made in each firm at the fiscal year-end 
prior to the deal announcement and are the same calculations employed in this study.  
However, Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015) also measure the investment horizon of 
institutional owners. Due to limitations in the databases available at FEP, this measure 
could not be employed. Instead, a different and more interesting measure regarding the 
different types of institutional investors is used. 
Following Elyasiani and Jia (2010), the data on institutional investor ownership is 
divided into a pressure-insensitive group and a pressure-sensitive group. The authors 
state that the pressure-insensitive group includes investment companies and 
independent investment advisors while the pressure-sensitive group includes bank trust 
departments, insurance companies and others. Considering the classification of 
investors provided by the Bureau van Dijk (the entire shareholder classification can be 
seen in appendix A), the pressure-insensitive group in this study is composed by the 
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institutional investors classified as E or Y and the pressure-sensitive group is composed 
by the institutional investors classified as A or B. 
A more comprehensive description of all the variables of the study can be seen in the 
following table. 
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Table 3 – Variables 
The table presents the full description of all the variables employed in this study, adapted from Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015). 
Variables Description
M&A Deal Variable
Cross-Border Deal (CROSS_BORDER) Binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm engages in a cross-border deal and 0 otherwise
Institutional Ownership Variables
Total Institutional Ownership (IO_TOTAL)
Total percentage shareholdings held by institutional investors in the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A 
announcement
Largest Institutional Investor (IO_LARGEST)
Percentage shareholdings held by the largest institutional investor in the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A 
announcement
Top 5 Institutional Ownership (IO_TOP5)
Aggregate percentage shareholdings held by the five largest institutional investors in the acquiring firm at the year-end 
prior to the M&A announcement
Foreign Institutional Ownership 
(IO_FOREIGN)
Aggregate percentage shareholdings held by foreign institutional investors in the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to 
the M&A announcement
Domestic Institutional Ownership 
(IO_DOMESTIC)
Aggregate percentage shareholdings held by domestic institutional investors in the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to 
the M&A announcement
Pressure-Sensitive Institutional Ownership 
(IO_PRESSURESENS)
Aggregate percentage shareholdings held by institutional investors classified as A or B (Bureau van Djik) in the 
acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Pressure-Insensitive Institutional Ownership 
(IO_PRESSUREINSENS)
Aggregate percentage shareholdings held by institutional investors classified as E or Y (Bureau van Djik) in the 
acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Domestic Pressure-Insensitive Institutional 
Ownership (IO_DOM_PRESSUREINSENS)
Aggregate percentage shareholdings held by institutional investors classified as E or Y (Bureau van Djik) in the 
acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Firm-specific Control Variables
Firm Size (FIRM_SIZE)
Natural logarithm of the total assets of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
ROA (FIRM_ROA) Return on assets (ratio of net income to total assets) of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A 
announcement
Leverage (FIRM_LEVERAGE)
Ratio of total debt to total assets of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Cash & Cash Equivalent (FIRM_CASH)
Ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Capital Expenditure 
(FIRM_CAPEX)
Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Intangible Assets (FIRM_INTANGIBLES)
Ratio of intangible assets to total assets of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
Tobin's Q 
(FIRM_TOBINSQ)
Ratio of market value of equity to total assets of the acquiring firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement
M&A Deal Related Control Variables
Cross Industry (DEAL_CROSSINDUSTRY) Binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring and the target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes and 0 otherwise
Listed Target (DEAL_LISTEDTARGET) Binary variable equal to 1 if the target firm is a publicly listed firm and 0 otherwise
Initial Stake (DEAL_INITIALSTAKE)
Binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm has an initial stake in the target firm prior to the M&A announcement and 
0 otherwise
Cash Payment (DEAL_CASH) Binary variable equal to 1 if the M&A deal employs cash only as a payment method and 0 otherwise
Financial Crisis (DEAL_FCRISIS) Binary variable equal to 1 if the M&A deal is announced during the 2007-2008 crisis period and 0 otherwise
M&A Experience 
(DEAL_MAEXPERIENCE)
Binary variable equal to 1 if the acquiring firm has M&A experience prior to the M&A announcement and 0 otherwise
 
 
 26 
4.4. Sample Description 
Considering that this study investigates the impact of institutional investors in cross-
border M&A, it is relevant to detail both the M&A deals included in the sample and the 
institutional shareholdings of the firms which initiate such deals. This section starts by 
describing the M&A deals, divided by year and by country, and proceeds to the 
description of the institutional shareholdings per country, finishing with the descriptive 
statistics of the institutional ownership variables. 
Table 4 presents the annual distribution of the 2038 M&A deals of the sample. The total 
value of M&A deals is approximately €850 billion and a significant proportion of it 
(68.55%) is constituted by cross-border deals (approximately €582 billion). Even 
though the proportion of the number of cross-border deals regarding the total number of 
deals (59.37%) is moderately lower, it is clear that cross-border deals are more frequent 
and larger in size than domestic deals. 
 
Table 4 – Annual Distribution of M&A 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the distribution of the 2038 M&A deals initiated by the firms of each 
country is widespread. In the following figure, it is possible to see the differences 
between each nation. 
Year
Number of Deals Deal Size Number of Deals Deal Size Number of Deals Deal Size
2007 164 119,966,479.36 193 71,623,986.93 357 191,590,466.29
2008 116 19,259,980.10 174 67,581,936.45 290 86,841,916.55
2009 73 23,808,295.00 96 38,095,497.50 169 61,903,792.50
2010 82 13,546,812.61 100 31,176,549.44 182 44,723,362.05
2011 77 18,908,453.22 121 38,584,281.74 198 57,492,734.96
2012 73 12,631,306.81 109 23,278,882.32 182 35,910,189.13
2013 50 16,567,531.00 95 20,711,328.49 145 37,278,859.49
2014 62 19,122,790.91 131 156,733,266.16 193 175,856,057.07
2015 76 16,152,430.03 113 93,182,555.47 189 109,334,985.50
2016 55 7,005,489.44 78 40,925,957.46 133 47,931,446.90
Total 828 266,969,568.48 1210 581,894,241.96 2038 848,863,810.44
Domestic Cross-Border Total
The table presents the annual distribution of M&A, partitioned by number of deals and deal size, for completed 
domestic and cross-border M&A initiated by firms from the countries included in the sample between 2007 and 
2016. Deal size is the M&A deal value in thousands of EUR. 
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Figure 2 – M&A Distribution per Country 
 
 
 
Figure 2 clearly displays that France is the country with the highest number of M&A in 
the sample, with French firms engaging in almost 500 deals throughout the selected 
period. On a lower level, Germany, Italy and Spain also exhibit a high deal activity, all 
of which with a number of deals between 200 and 300. Netherlands, Finland, Ireland 
and Belgium demonstrate a more moderate frequency of deals, with each of these 
countries attaining a number of deals between 100 and 200. On the bottom of the 
sample, Greece, Portugal, Austria, Slovenia and Luxembourg are the countries where 
M&A deals occur less frequently in the sample, with the last four showing less than 50 
deals in the entire sample. 
The figure also confirms that cross-border deals are more frequent than domestic deals. 
This is true for every country in the sample except for Greece, Italy and Portugal, in 
which domestic deals are more frequent, and also for Spain, in which the number of 
domestic deals and cross-border deals are roughly the same. 
Regarding the institutional investors, the differences between institutional shareholdings 
in each country can be seen in the following table. It is important to notice that some 
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The figure presents the total number of M&A, for completed domestic and cross-border deals initiated by the 
firms of each country included in the sample between 2007 and 2016. Each country is represented by its initials, 
which are defined in the glossary. 
 
 
 28 
firms conduct more than one deal in the same year throughout the sample period; hence, 
it is logical that the ownership structure of such firms is only accounted once. This 
reason illustrates why the number of firms in the sample is different from the number of 
deals.  
Table 5 – Institutional Shareholdings per Country 
 
 
 
 
The countries which exhibit higher values of institutional ownership are Ireland, 
Netherlands and Finland while the countries which exhibit lower values of institutional 
ownership are Greece, Luxembourg and Belgium. The reported values are similar to the 
ones documented by Ferreira et al. (2010) and by Bena et al. (2016). 
The descriptive statistics presented in the following table demonstrate that, in general, 
European firms exhibit lower values of institutional ownership than the UK 
(Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015) and the U.S. (Bena et al., 2016). Moreover, foreign 
institutional shareholders are more prevalent than domestic institutional shareholders. If 
we look at the previous table, this is true for every country except Finland, Slovenia and 
Spain. Also, the group of pressure-sensitive investors is more prominent than the group 
of pressure-insensitive investors and this is verified in every single country. The full 
descriptive statistics broken down by country can be seen in appendix B. 
AT 18.48 3.51 10.08 16.50 1.98 11.53 6.95 23
BE 14.81 4.16 9.43 11.09 3.72 10.92 3.89 89
FI 28.00 6.41 16.03 11.63 16.37 15.65 12.35 161
FR 23.59 6.11 14.20 12.72 10.88 14.49 9.11 389
DE 20.53 6.32 13.32 14.10 6.43 13.90 6.63 256
GR 7.64 2.99 6.10 5.46 2.18 6.02 1.62 48
IE 38.88 7.52 21.12 36.51 2.37 21.15 17.73 86
IT 15.58 5.51 10.67 10.20 5.38 9.63 5.95 221
LU 11.88 1.94 5.76 11.85 0.02 9.03 2.85 7
NL 34.56 8.48 21.78 24.67 9.89 21.49 13.07 134
PT 15.82 5.93 12.75 9.45 6.37 11.78 4.04 37
SI 19.77 7.66 17.13 2.96 16.80 14.06 5.70 13
ES 24.55 8.79 17.31 12.01 12.53 17.68 6.87 161
8.73 14.52 8.46 1,625
All 
Countries
22.98 6.38 14.46 14.25
IO_PRESSURE
INSENS (%)
Number 
of Firms
IO_TOTAL 
(%)
IO_LARGEST 
(%)
IO_TOP5 
(%)
IO_FOREIGN 
(%)
IO_DOMESTIC 
(%)
IO_PRESSURE
SENS (%)
The table presents the mean values of the institutional ownership variables (except IO_DOM_PRESSUREINSENS) 
for each country included in the sample. The variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, the correlation matrix regarding the institutional ownership variables can be seen 
in the next table. As expected, the variables exhibit a high correlation between them, 
considering that they all refer to institutional ownership. 
 
Table 7 – Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean Median Min Max Std Deviation Number of Observations
22.98 18.15 0.00 92.75 19.71 1,625
6.38 4.99 0.00 63.18 7.34 1,625
14.46 11.77 0.00 69.37 12.42 1,625
14.25 9.08 0.00 87.58 15.77 1,625
8.73 4.32 0.00 76.58 11.71 1,625
14.52 10.87 0.00 76.83 13.58 1,625
8.46 4.89 0.00 69.55 10.05 1,625IO_PRESSUREINSENS
IO_TOTAL
IO_LARGEST
IO_TOP5
IO_FOREIGN
IO_DOMESTIC
IO_PRESSURESENS
IO_TOTAL IO_LARGEST IO_TOP5 IO_FOREIGN IO_DOMESTIC IO_PRESSURESENS IO_PRESSUREINSENS
IO_TOTAL 1 0.60 0.88 0.80 0.60 0.88 0.77
IO_LARGEST 0.60 1 0.83 0.27 0.64 0.55 0.42
IO_TOP5 0.88 0.83 1 0.56 0.72 0.78 0.66
IO_FOREIGN 0.80 0.27 0.56 1 0.01 0.65 0.70
IO_DOMESTIC 0.60 0.64 0.72 0.01 1 0.61 0.36
IO_PRESSURESENS 0.88 0.55 0.78 0.65 0.61 1 0.38
IO_PRESSUREINSENS 0.77 0.42 0.66 0.70 0.36 0.38 1
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the institutional ownership variables (except IO_DOM_PRESSUREINSENS) 
employed in this study. The variables are defined in Table 2. 
The table presents the correlation matrix for the institutional ownership variables (except IO_DOM_PRESSUREINSENS) 
employed in this study. The variables are defined in Table 2. 
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4.5. Methodology 
In this last section, the methodology of the study is described. 
Firstly, in order to analyze the differences in institutional ownership and firm-specific 
characteristics between the domestic and cross-border M&A in the sample, a univariate 
analysis is conducted, as Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015) suggest.  
This analysis is realized through a test of difference in means. This test measures if the 
mean of one sample is different than the mean of another sample. When the standard 
deviations of the population are not known, the two samples are independent
2
 and the 
samples are taken from two normally or approximately normally distributed 
populations, the test of difference in means is performed with a t-test, with the 
following hypothesis:  
H0: μ1 – μ2  = 0 
H1: μ1 – μ2  ≠ 0 
The test assumes that the variances across the two samples are unequal. If the test 
rejects the null hypothesis, then the means of the two samples are different and can thus 
be compared (Bluman, 2009).  
Moreover, the test of difference between medians is also performed. The test is similar 
to the test of differences in means and is performed to reinforce the results obtained 
with the test of difference between means. 
After the univariate analysis, the regression analysis is performed. The probability of a 
European firm acquiring a cross-border target is estimated through a Probit regression 
in a panel dataset, again following Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015). 
The sample selected for this study comprises several firms that acquire multiple targets 
in the same year, which represents a three-dimensional panel dataset. However, the 
software package Eviews does not allow the estimation of multidimensional panel 
datasets. Thus, in order to allow the estimation through the panel data methodology, a 
                                                        
2 Samples are independent samples when they are not related, that is if the value of one sample does not 
affect the values in the other sample (Bluman, 2009) 
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slight modification of the observations is made. If a firm acquires more than one target 
in a given year, the mean values of the deal related variables are calculated (the 
institutional ownership and the firm specific values are always the same) and used in a 
single observation. This modification yields a sample of 637 domestic deals and 988 
cross-border deals, in a total of 1,625 deals. 
Moreover, there are several firms which engage in multiple M&A throughout the 
different years of the sample. Hence, the regression is also calculated using cluster-
adjusted standard errors, following Petersen (2009), which allows the attainment of 
robust results and interpretations (Cameron et al., 2008). 
The empirical model, adapted from Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015), is defined as: 
                          
                                   
                                       
                              
                                   
                                        
                   
                         
                        
                                        
                   
                               (3.5.1) 
 
where i refers to the firm and t refers to the year time period. The variable 
CROSS_BORDERi,t is the dependent variable and P(CROSS_BORDERi,t =1 | X) 
denotes the probability that a deal is a cross-border deal. Concerning the right side of 
the equation, Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution and c is the constant term. The main explanatory variables are the 
institutional ownership variables IO_TOTALi,t, IO_LARGESTi,t, IO_TOP5i,t, 
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IO_FOREIGNi,t and IO_PRESSUREINSENSi,t and the parameters β are estimated 
through the maximum likelihood method. The firm specific variables and the M&A 
deal related variables are used as control variables, in order to allow more robust 
conclusions. Finally, εi,t is the error term (Wooldridge, 2013). 
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5. Empirical Results 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical analysis are presented. The chapter is divided 
in three sections: the first section exposes the results of the univariate analysis between 
domestic and cross-border deals; the second section presents the results of the 
regression analysis; the third and final section displays the results of robustness tests. 
 
5.1. Domestic vs. Cross-Border M&A  
In order to obtain a more accurate description of the sample, the differences between 
institutional ownership and firm-level characteristics between domestic and cross-
border M&A are analyzed. In the following table, the results of the univariate analysis 
between domestic and cross-border M&A are reported.  
Table 8 – Univariate Analysis 
 
 
 
The results show that institutional shareholders hold statistically larger stakes in firms 
conducting cross-border M&A (26.33%) than firms conducting domestic M&A 
(17.79%). The institutional ownership is also more concentrated in firms engaging in 
cross-border deals, given that the largest institutional ownership is statistically larger in 
cross-border deals (15.71%) than domestic deals (12.52%). This suggests that 
Variables
N Mean Median N Mean Median
IO_TOTAL 637 17.79 12.57 988 26.33 22.28 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
IO_LARGEST 637 6.24 3.88 988 6.47 5.08 (0.5460) (0.0000)***
IO_FOREIGN 637 9.16 4.64 988 17.54 12.96 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
IO_PRESSUREINSENS 637 6.38 2.67 988 9.80 6.19 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
FIRM_SIZE 637 15.09 15.04 988 14.38 14.31 (0.0000)*** (0.0017)***
FIRM_ROA 637 2.40 3.23 988 3.72 4.38 (0.0129)** (0.0000)***
FIRM_LEVERAGE 637 0.61 0.61 988 0.57 0.57 (0.0345)** (0.0028)***
FIRM_CASH 637 0.11 0.08 988 0.12 0.09 (0.1630) (0.0857)*
FIRM_CAPEX 637 0.06 0.04 988 0.06 0.04 (0.0301)** (0.1279)
FIRM_INTANGIBLES 637 0.23 0.20 988 0.24 0.22 (0.1586)** (0.1643)
FIRM_TOBINSQ 637 0.86 0.59 988 1.09 0.81 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
Test of Difference 
in Means
Test of Difference 
in Medians
Cross-BorderDomestic
The table presents descriptive statistics of the institutional ownership and firm-specific variables employed in 
equation (3.5.1) for two sub-groups of firms: firms engaging in domestic M&A and firms engaging in cross-
border M&A. The variables are defined in Table 3. The test of difference in means (medians) reports the p-
values for the homogeneity test for means (medians) assuming unequal variances across the two sub-groups. 
Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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institutional shareholders may have an important influence in the decision to engage in 
cross-border M&A. 
Moreover, firms acquiring foreign targets exhibit larger stakes held by foreign 
institutional investors (17.54%) than firms acquiring domestic targets (9.16%). These 
results suggest that, among institutional investors, foreign shareholders may have a 
more active role in encouraging cross-border M&A than domestic shareholders. 
Regarding the type of institutional investors, firms targeting foreign companies show 
statistically higher levels of both pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors, consistent with the total higher institutional shareholdings in this group. 
Interestingly, the results on firm-specific characteristics demonstrate that firms 
engaging in domestic deals are bigger and slightly more leveraged than firms engaging 
in cross-border deals. On the contrary, firms engaging in cross-border deals exhibit 
higher profitability and higher stock valuation than firms engaging in domestic deals. 
 
5.2. Determinants of Cross-Border M&A 
The regression equation was run in EViews using the Binary Choice Probit estimation 
method. The following table presents the estimation output. 
Table 9 – Estimation Output of Equation 5.3.1. 
        
  
Variable Coefficient 
  
        
  
C 
0.583672**   
  (0.252428)   
  
IO_TOTAL 
0.01166***   
  (0.004193)   
  
IO_LARGEST 
-0.021406***   
  (0.006377)   
  
IO_FOREIGN 
0.016921***   
  (0.004321)   
  
IO_PRESSUREINSENS 
-0.006188   
  (0.005577)   
  FIRM_SIZE -0.040965***   
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  (0.011148)   
  
FIRM_ROA 
-0.001078   
  (0.003333)   
  
FIRM_LEVERAGE 
-0.269312***   
  (0.102648)   
  
FIRM_CASH 
-0.610224**   
  (0.309554)   
  
FIRM_CAPEX 
-0.872218   
  (0.533569)   
  
FIRM_INTANGIBLES 
-0.220284   
  (0.185869)   
  
FIRM_TOBINSQ 
0.14129***   
  (0.036274)   
  
DEAL_CROSSINDUSTRY 
-0.08889   
  (0.07006)   
  
DEAL_LISTEDTARGET 
0.258874   
  (0.182046)   
  
DEAL_INITIALSTAKE 
-0.414223***   
  (0.080332)   
  
DEAL_CASH 
0.366488***   
  (0.085886)   
  
DEAL_FCRISIS 
-0.088202   
  (0.075563)   
  
DEAL_MAEXPERIENCE 
0.29845**   
  (0.145514)   
        
        
  Obs. 1625   
  Pseudo R² (%) 10.27   
  LR Statistic 223.4748   
  Prob (LR statistic) 0.0000   
  Wald Chi² 94.5   
  p-value Wald test 0.0000   
  Correctly classified (%) 68.62   
        
        
 
 
 
The likelihood ratio test provides evidence that this model is globally statistically 
significant. The Pseudo R-Squared of a Probit model is closely related to the R-Squared 
The table presents the results of the probit regression for estimating the probability of a European firm acquiring a 
cross-border target. The dependent variable is the variable CROSS_BORDER, as defined in Table 3. All other 
variables are defined in Table 3. Robust standard errors following Petersen (2009) are reported in parenthesis 
under each coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Correctly 
classified (%) compares the fitted and actual values based on a 0.50 cut-off point. 
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from OLS estimation; thus, it is possible to conclude that 10.27% of the variance 
regarding the probability of a European firm acquiring a foreign target is explained by 
the contributions of the independent variables. Also, the model correctly predicts 
68.62% of its previsions. The Wald test, performed for the main explanatory variables, 
rejects the null hypothesis of insignificance in the model, which means that the 
variables can jointly predict the probability of a cross-border deal (Wooldridge, 2013). 
These measures suggest a high reliability and accuracy of the explanatory variables. 
Regarding the estimates, three of the four main explanatory variables are statistically 
significant. The results show that a higher percentage of total institutional ownership 
has a positive and significative influence on the likelihood of a cross-border M&A, 
implying that the probability of a firm acquiring a foreign target increases by 1.2% if 
the total institutional ownership rises 1%, other things being equal. This finding is 
consistent with Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015) and Zhou et al. (2016) who argue that 
institutional investors play an active role in the firm’s decision-making and corporate 
strategies and have, in fact, effective monitoring skills. 
Contrary to Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015), it was found evidence that the largest 
institutional shareholder exerts influence on the acquisition decision. Considering that 
in cross-border deals, acquirers pay a lower premium (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) 
and may experience significant gains in its stock price (Chari et al., 2010), the influence 
of the largest shareholder should be positive. However, the evidence indicates that the 
largest investor is averse to engaging in cross-border M&A, as the probability of a firm 
acquiring a foreign target decreases by 2.1% if the largest institutional shareholding 
rises 1%, other things being equal. This implies that cross-border M&A may potentially 
distort the existing corporate governance dynamics and the influence the largest 
shareholder exerts, as Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015) reason regarding large deals. 
Furthermore, it is possible to conclude that foreign institutional ownership has a 
positive and significative influence on the likelihood of a cross-border M&A. The 
results demonstrate that the probability of a firm acquiring a foreign target increases by 
1.7% if the foreign institutional ownership rises 1%, other things being equal. This 
finding is consistent with Ferreira et al. (2010) and Andriosopoulos and Yang (2015), 
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who state that foreign institutional investors act as facilitators in the international 
market for reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries. 
No evidence was found on the influence of the pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors on the likelihood of a cross-border M&A. One possible reason to explain this 
result is advanced by Gillan and Starks (2003), who suggest that foreign institutional 
investors belong to the group of pressure-insensitive investors because they have fewer 
business relations with the firms they invest in. Hence, considering that the influence of 
foreign investors is already being accounted for in the model, it is possible that the 
effect of the pressure-insensitive institutional investors is not being properly captured. 
Regarding the firm-specific control variables, the results illustrate that firm size, 
leverage and liquidity have a negative influence on the probability of acquiring a cross-
border target whereas Tobin’s Q wields a positive influence. As for the deal-related 
control variables, cross-border M&A are more likely to occur if the acquiring firm does 
not hold any stake in the target firm prior to the deal, if the payment method is through 
cash and if the acquiring firm has prior M&A experience. 
Overall, it is possible to conclude that institutional investors have an important impact 
on the decision to engage in cross-border M&A. 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
In this section, three alternative approaches are presented in order to verify the results 
obtained with the estimation. 
Taking into account that the sample encompasses several countries, it is meaningful to 
understand if there are any country effects in the estimation. Thus, the regression 
equation is estimated with 12 additional dummy variables, each variable taking the 
value of 1 if the acquiring firm is from the country in question and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, the sample also covers several industries, divided by the SIC code major 
groups. Following the same reasoning as before, the regression equation is estimated 
with another additional 7 dummy variables, each variable taking the value of 1 if the 
acquiring firm is from the industry in question and 0 otherwise. 
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Also, considering that the largest institutional investor  has a negative influence on the 
probability of acquiring a foreign firm and with the objective of providing a better 
understanding of the influence of institutional ownership concentration, the variable 
regarding the largest institutional investor is substituted in the regression equation by 
the cumulative five largest shareholdings, as Hartzell and Starks (2003) suggest. 
Moreover, accounting for the case of the pressure-insensitive group including the 
foreign investors, the variable regarding the pressure-insensitive institutional investors 
is replaced by a variable concerning only the domestic pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors in the regression equation. 
The following table presents the estimation output of these alternative approaches. The 
regression equation with the country and industry controls is displayed on column 1. On 
column 2, the regression equation with the top 5 institutional shareholders instead of the 
largest institutional investor is presented. On column 3, it is shown the regression 
equation with the domestic pressure-insensitive institutional investors instead of the 
entire group of pressure-insensitive institutional investors. 
Table 10 – Robustness Checks of Equation 5.3.1. 
                
  
Variable 
Coefficient 
  
              
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
              
                
  
C 
-0.652202**   -0.646506**   -0.636748**   
  (0.316407)   (0.318996)   (0.319542)   
  
IO_TOTAL 
0.009571**   0.016715**   0.010668**   
  (0.004469)   (0.006598)   (0.005084)   
  
IO_LARGEST 
-0.01539**   
 
  -0.016501**   
  (0.006708)       (0.00687)   
  
IO_TOP5 
    -0.017788**       
  
 
  (0.007327)       
  
IO_FOREIGN 
0.015105***   0.0137***   0.010299**   
  (0.004765)   (0.005002)   (0.005535)   
  
IO_PRESSUREINSENS 
-0.008982   -0.008129       
  (0.005893)   (0.005922)       
  
IO_DOM_PRESSUREINSENS 
        -0.010274   
  
 
  
 
  (0.008079)   
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The table presents the results of probit regressions for estimating the probability of a European firm acquiring a cross-
border target. The dependent variable is the variable CROSS_BORDER, as defined in Table 3. All other variables are 
defined in Table 3. Robust standard errors following Petersen (2009) are reported in parenthesis under each 
coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Correctly classified (%) 
compares the fitted and actual values based on a 0.50 cut-off point. 
  
FIRM_SIZE 
0.025604*   0.026586*   0.024768   
  (0.015557)   (0.015663)   (0.015703)   
  
FIRM_ROA 
-0.002331   -0.002453   -0.001955   
  (0.003457)   (0.00349)   (0.003494)   
  
FIRM_LEVERAGE 
-0.197542*   -0.204937*   -0.195204*   
  (0.108766)   (0.109718)   (0.109779)   
  
FIRM_CASH 
-0.563155*   -0.55152   -0.577564*   
  (0.332879)   (0.335306)   (0.335723)   
  
FIRM_CAPEX 
-0.7447   -0.757625   -0.755529   
  (0.551697)   (0.554883)   (0.556604)   
  
FIRM_INTANGIBLES 
-0.17432   -0.182463   -0.173124   
  (0.208613)   (0.210722)   (0.210625)   
  
FIRM_TOBINSQ 
0.148763***   0.149334***   0.148155***   
  (0.038019)   (0.038333)   (0.038404)   
  
DEAL_CROSSINDUSTRY 
-0.08458   -0.088419   -0.082636   
  (0.073806)   (0.074571)   (0.074463)   
  
DEAL_LISTEDTARGET 
0.341373*   0.370093**   0.343961*   
  (0.184511)   (0.185792)   (0.186319)   
  
DEAL_INITIALSTAKE 
-0.357099***   -0.367792***   -0.356875***   
  (0.083696)   (0.084429)   (0.084531)   
  
DEAL_CASH 
0.309248***   0.303253***   0.309602***   
  (0.089053)   (0.089989)   (0.089965)   
  
DEAL_FCRISIS 
-0.069453   -0.057241   -0.067865   
  (0.078713)   (0.079535)   (0.079422)   
  
DEAL_MAEXPERIENCE 
0.286418*   0.288641*   0.287669*   
  (0.152835)   (0.154039)   (0.154533)   
  
Country Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
        
  
Industry Controls Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
        
                
                
  Obs. 1625   1625   1625   
  Pseudo R² (%) 15.18   15.21   15.15   
  LR Statistic 330.3300   331.0492   329.6698   
  Prob (LR statistic) 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
  Wald Chi² 54.59   54.52   52.83   
  p-value Wald test 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
  Correctly classified (%) 69.85   70.22   70.15   
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All approaches wield similar results regarding the global statistical significance of the 
model, with only marginal differences comparing to the main empirical model. 
After controlling for country and industry effects, the results of the main empirical 
model still hold, as is demonstrated in column 1. It can be concluded that the effects of 
institutional ownership in cross-border M&A are valid across all countries and 
industries in the sample. 
The results in column 2 demonstrate that the influence of the 5 largest shareholders is 
negative and significant, with the probability of a firm acquiring a foreign target 
decreasing by 1.7% if the 5 largest institutional shareholdings rise 1%, other things 
being equal. This result is very similar to the result obtained in the main empirical 
model, when the estimation is run with the largest institutional shareholding. Thus, it 
becomes clear that the influence of the largest institutional shareholders is contrary to 
the influence of the entire institutional shareholders.  
Column 3 demonstrates that no evidence was found on the influence of the domestic 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors on the likelihood of a cross-border M&A. 
Hence, it is possible to conclude that the type of institutional investors does not 
influence the decision of an acquirer targeting a cross-border or a domestic firm. 
In general, these robustness checks provide evidence that the results of the main 
empirical model maintain its validity. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The present study examines the impact of institutional investors on the probability of 
firms from the Euro Area engaging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In order to 
provide a greater insight into institutional ownership effects, measures of ownership 
concentration and types of institutional investors were employed alongside the overall 
institutional ownership. To allow for more robust results, firm-specific and deal-specific 
characteristics and country and industry effects were also accounted for. 
The evidence found suggests that the total institutional shareholdings and the foreign 
institutional shareholdings increase the probability that a Eurozone firm chooses to 
acquire a foreign target while a higher institutional ownership concentration decreases 
such probability. No evidence was found regarding the type of institutional investors. 
The results on total and foreign institutional ownership are in line with the previous 
studies on this topic and indicate that institutional investors are effective monitors of a 
firm’s management and exert a significative influence on a firm’s decision making; the 
results also indicate that foreign institutional investors act as facilitators for reducing 
transaction costs and information asymmetries in international markets. On the other 
hand, the results on institutional ownership concentration suggest that cross-border 
M&A can potentially distort the existing corporate governance dynamics and the 
influence the largest shareholders exert. This study has significant contributions for the 
literature considering that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to 
focus solely on European countries. Even though it is a relevant topic, the majority of 
the evidence is focused on the U.S., the U.K. and China and concerns the institutional 
ownership on target firms instead of acquiring firms. Hence, this study partially fills this 
literature gap. 
This study has one important limitation that must be mentioned. Several authors argue 
that an active and large stock market may inherently attract large and foreign 
institutional investors, which may result in a potential endogeneity bias in the 
estimations. The endogeneity was not accounted for in this study due to data limitations 
and it must be considered that the results may be different, even though in the prior 
literature the endogeneity adjustments only reinforce the results previously obtained.  
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Regarding future research suggestions, to overcome the aforementioned limitation, it 
would be valuable to test if endogeneity is present in the sample and, if it is, to correct 
it, in order to provide even more robust results. Finally, it would also be interesting to 
conduct the same investigation in other countries, particularly in emerging economies, 
to understand if the effects found hold. 
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The table presents the classification of the type of shareholder of the Bureau van Dijk 
databases. Source: Bureau van Dijk 
Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
  
Classification Shareholder Type
A Insurance Company
B Bank
C Trade and Industry Organisation
D Nameless private stockholders, aggregated
E Mutual and Pension Fund
F Financial Company
I One or more named individuals or families
J Foundation / Research Institute
L Other named shareholders, aggregated
M Employees/Managers/Directors
P Private Equity Firms
S Public Authority / State / Government
V Venture Capital
Y Hedge Funds
Z Public
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The table presents the full descriptive statistics of all the institutional ownership variables (except 
IO_DOM_PRESSUREINSENS) broken down by each country included in the sample. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
Appendix B 
 
 
All Countries Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Slovenia Spain
Mean 22.98 18.48 14.81 28.00 23.59 20.53 7.64 38.88 15.58 11.88 34.56 15.82 19.77 24.55
Median 18.15 13.20 11.49 26.92 19.26 17.05 3.82 43.12 12.14 8.05 36.00 13.56 14.11 20.04
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.00
Max 92.75 74.83 80.88 82.19 92.75 79.32 36.69 87.58 77.57 35.32 87.68 35.72 52.07 83.54
Std. Deviation 19.71 18.67 14.49 19.77 19.48 18.24 9.03 24.34 14.56 12.49 22.28 10.01 18.77 18.50
Mean 6.38 3.51 4.16 6.41 6.11 6.32 2.99 7.52 5.51 1.94 8.48 5.93 7.66 8.79
Median 4.99 3.71 2.81 5.34 4.95 4.57 1.66 7.07 2.77 1.45 6.34 5.38 5.59 5.73
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00
Max 63.18 9.20 44.66 50.70 56.00 48.71 20.11 23.58 63.18 4.89 49.93 19.98 26.09 54.68
Std. Deviation 7.34 2.75 5.95 5.63 6.63 7.99 3.72 4.54 8.28 1.43 8.12 4.56 7.82 9.64
Mean 14.46 10.08 9.43 16.03 14.20 13.32 6.10 21.12 10.67 5.76 21.78 12.75 17.13 17.31
Median 11.77 6.31 6.43 15.37 11.69 10.95 3.40 21.43 7.35 3.69 21.12 13.32 12.34 15.23
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.00
Max 69.37 29.68 63.88 50.70 68.70 66.65 23.37 60.79 69.37 16.62 61.58 32.07 41.86 68.71
Std. Deviation 12.42 8.95 9.77 11.00 11.81 12.06 7.08 12.61 10.83 5.23 15.26 7.52 16.39 13.38
Mean 14.25 16.50 11.09 11.63 12.72 14.10 5.46 36.51 10.20 11.85 24.67 9.45 2.96 12.01
Median 9.08 10.58 7.59 7.37 8.47 9.68 1.68 36.52 6.96 8.05 21.65 7.91 1.60 7.37
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00
Max 87.58 73.80 67.18 45.25 82.43 66.87 29.29 87.58 58.71 35.32 82.67 29.12 15.42 61.43
Std. Deviation 15.77 18.24 12.42 12.04 13.30 14.78 7.58 24.67 11.32 12.51 19.23 8.21 4.19 13.49
Mean 8.73 1.98 3.72 16.37 10.88 6.43 2.18 2.37 5.38 0.02 9.89 6.37 16.80 12.53
Median 4.32 1.19 2.27 12.75 7.33 4.03 0.45 0.00 1.64 0.00 3.89 4.74 13.46 7.24
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00
Max 76.58 8.49 30.00 72.07 63.28 57.80 20.38 19.91 64.83 0.16 56.23 18.92 43.61 76.58
Std. Deviation 11.71 2.06 5.20 14.26 12.02 8.89 3.92 4.68 9.75 0.06 12.55 5.95 17.03 14.66
Mean 14.52 11.53 10.92 15.65 14.49 13.90 6.02 21.15 9.63 9.03 21.49 11.78 14.06 17.68
Median 10.87 8.42 8.99 14.77 10.76 10.76 3.33 23.33 7.09 5.87 20.70 10.45 8.83 13.14
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.00
Max 76.83 39.16 62.66 53.13 64.17 63.63 28.86 48.29 50.82 27.35 60.83 33.47 51.72 76.83
Std. Deviation 13.58 10.34 10.84 12.76 13.22 13.80 7.45 14.24 10.25 9.80 15.70 8.35 15.44 15.80
Mean 8.46 6.95 3.89 12.35 9.11 6.63 1.62 17.73 5.95 2.85 13.07 4.04 5.70 6.87
Median 4.89 2.37 2.25 10.71 5.98 3.82 0.26 16.53 3.05 1.88 10.27 2.25 3.06 4.14
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 69.55 35.67 23.44 50.48 62.53 36.01 9.78 69.55 66.41 7.97 65.79 17.19 19.75 41.75
Std. Deviation 10.05 9.57 4.99 9.94 9.94 7.90 2.58 14.75 9.08 2.90 12.26 4.46 6.53 8.19
1,625 23 89 161 389 256 48 86 221 7 134 37 13 161
Total Institutional Ownership
Largest Institutional Investor
Top 5 Institutional Ownership
Foreign Institutional Ownership
Domestic Institutional Ownership
Pressure-Sensitive Institutional Ownership
Pressure-Insensitive Institutional Ownership
Number of Firms
